Message Text

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PAGE 01 JIDDA 02361 280716Z ACTION NEA-10

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FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7802

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

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TAGS: PFOR, PLO, SA

SUBJ: THE PNC AND THE PLO: SAUDI REACTIONS AND VIEW OF PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

REF: TEL AVIV 2123

- 1. DEPARTMENT AND OTHER RECIPIENTS MAY FIND IT INTERESTING TO CONSIDER OUTCOME OF AND PROSPECTS ARISING FROM PNC MEETING IN CAIRO AS SEEN FROM SAUDI ARABIA. MOST OF YOU HAVE RECEIVED OUR PRE-PNC ESTIMATE OF SAUDI INTEREST IN ARAFAT.
- 2. ISRAELIS ARE CORRECT IN ESTIMATING THAT PLO WISHED TO AVOID CHANGES IN GOALS TO EASE PROBLEMS OF MAINTAINING LEADER-SHIP. THAT IS CONVENTIONAL WISDOM WITH BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JIDDA 02361 280716Z

- 3. SADAT'S STATEMENTS TO EFFECT COVENANT WOULD BE CHANGED REPRESENTED HIS HOPES PERHAPS AND REFLECTED HIS LACK OF INFLUENCE OVER PLO LEADERSHIP AND HIS INSIGHTS. I DON'T BELIEVE HE WOULD HAVE DELIBERATELY MISLED US.
- 4. THE EVENTS EMERGING FROM THE PNC MEETING WERE SATISFAC-

TORY TO TOP-LEVEL SAUDIS, WHO ARE NOT HOWEVER COMPLACENT ABOUT THE FUTURE. THEY BELIEVE THAT MODERATION OR LACK OF IT WAS MUCH LESS IMPORTANT AS A FACTOR IN THE MATTER THAN THE NEED TO REAFFIRM THE LEADERSHIP OF ARAFAT AND THUS DEMONSTRATE SOLIDARITY TO OTHERS, THE UNITED STATES IN PARTICULAR.

5. SEEN FROM HERE, THE NEXT STEP WILL BE PLO/ARAFAT PLANNING ON OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THEM IF AMERICANS DO NOT BRING ABOUT INVITATION FOR PLO PARTICIPATION AT GENEVA, EITHER WHEN CONFERENCE BEGINS, OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER. IN ANY CASE, PLO WOULD BE IN GENEVA EITHER AT THE TABLE OR CLOSE TO IT.

6. IF NOT INVITED AT OUTSET, PLO WOULD CREATE PROBLEMS FOR THOSE WHO SEEM INCLINED TO ACCEPT INVITATION (READ EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS). SAUDIS WOULD CONTINUE THEIR FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR PLO AND WOULD MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON USG TO EVOKE INVITATION; CONCURRENTLY, IT WOULD NOT BE SURPRISING IF SAUDI SUPPORT PAYMENTS TO EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS ARE SOMEWHAT SLOWED. MOST OTHER ARAB GOVTS WOULD ALIGN WITH PLO, AS EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN PROBLEMS ARE OF LESS CONSEQUENCE TO THEM, GENERALLY SPEAKING, THAN GETTING THE PLO INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, IT SEEMS DOUBTFUL THAT EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS WOULD FIND IT CONVENIENT TO ATTEND, DESPITE STATEMENTS OF THEIR LEADERSHIP TO EFFECT THEY WILL NOT LET PLO INTERFERE WITH PROGRESS TOWARD GENEVA.

8. ALL THIS REMINDS ONE VIVIDLY OF THE EXPERIENCE OF OUR DELEGATION AT THE FIRST UN CONFERENCE ON PALESTINE IN LAUSANNE. THE CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 JIDDA 02361 280716Z

PALESTINIANS (INCLUDING THE ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE AND OTHERS) WERE THERE IN FORCE AS ASSOCIATES OF THE VARIOUS ARAB DELEGATIONS (AS THE ISRAELIS PREFERRED), AND THE RESULT WAS THAT NO ARAB DELEGATION COULD FUNCTION. IN FACT, WE DID NOT SUCCEED IN ARRANGING ANY MEETINGS AT ALL BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS. WHEN WE ASKED THE ARABS WHY THEY CAME TO LAUSANNE, THEY SAID IT WAS IN DEFERENCE TO WORLD OPINION. WHEN OUR CHIEF DELEGATE ASKED THE EGYPTIAN WHAT HE FORESAW AS ISRAELI-ARAB RELATIONS TEN YEARS INTO FUTURE, ASSUMING SETTLEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED, THE EGYPTIAN REPLIED, "WAR, OF COURSE. WHAT ELSE?".

9. POINT OF ALL THIS IS THAT IF FORMULA IS FOUND FOR BRINGING PALESTINIANS TO GENEVA IT SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO ENCOMPASS THEM IN ONE DELEGATION. OTHERWISE, THEY'RE LIKELY TO INVOLVE OTHERS IN THEIR INCESSANT QUARRELS, THUS SLOWING OR HALTING PROGRESS ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM.

PORTER

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